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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Evin Devan was convicted, following a jury trial, of conspiracy to commit burglary,
burglary, and trespassing.

Mr.

Devan asserts that the prosecutor committed

misconduct during closing argument, rising to the level of a fundamental error, when the
prosecutor used inflammatory language calculated to appeal to the passions and
prejudice of the jury in characterizing defense counsel, and misstated the arguments
raised by defense counsel during the course of closing arguments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Evin Devan was charged with felony conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary
as well as misdemeanor trespassing.

(R., pp.19-21; 151.)

Karl Riebe, the alleged

victim, testified at trial that, in the early morning hours on the day prior to the charged
offenses, he had heard a vehicle idling near his mother's property, which was adjacent
to his own. (Trial Tr. 1, p.169, L.19 - p.178, L.9.) After the vehicle drove off, Mr. Riebe
went to check on his mother's property. (Trial Tr., ,p.178, L.22 - p.180, L.7.) Mr. Riebe
found that there was a shipping container on the property that had been broken into,
some wire that had been strung out from the large spool that .it had been wound around,
and other items that appeared to be out of place. (Trial Tr., p.180, L.8 - p.182, L.23.)
Because it was still too early in the morning for it to be light outside, Mr. Riebe then
returned home to wait for daylight. (Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.2-15.)

1

Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, for ease
of reference, citations made herein to the primary volume of transcripts for the trial and
sentencing proceedings in this case are referred to herein as "Trial Tr." All other
citations to the transcripts are made in accordance with the date of the proceeding
transcribed.
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Although he decided not to call police, Mr. Riebe kept watch over his property the
rest of the day. Based on the way that items on his property had been moved around,
Mr. Riebe believed that the people who had been on his property would return in order
to take some of the items kept there. (Trial Tr., p.183, L.16 - p.185, L.14.) Later that
evening, Mr. Riebe donned camouflage and night vision goggles, and found a hiding
spot to lie in wait for anyone that might return to try to re-enter his property. (Trial Tr.,
p.185, L.15 - p.186, L.20.)
Shortly before three in the morning, Mr. Riebe saw two vehicles drive past and
park next to where he was hiding by the side of the road adjacent to his property. (Trial
Tr., p.187, Ls.8-20.) As he moved closer to the road, he saw five or six people who
initially had a discussion as a group, but then started walking together down the road
towards Mr. Riebe's property. (Trial Tr., p.189, L.14 - p.192, L.23.) Mr. Riebe testified
that one of the people in this group was carrying a pair of bolt cutters with him at the
time.

(Trial Tr., p.193, L.25 - p.194, L.11.)

The group headed towards a spot on

Mr. Riebe's barbed wire fence where the wire had been cut the night before. (Trial Tr.,
p.195, Ls.5-16.) Mr. Riebe lost sight of this group as they then moved towards some
trailers that were on his property. (Trial Tr., p.206, L.21 - p.207, L.1.)
According to his testimony, Mr. Riebe then crawled across the street towards
where the two trucks were parked.

(Trial Tr., p.208, L.20 - p.210, L.6.)

He could

discern the license numbers on one of the vehicles, but he didn't have anything to write
the numbers down with. (Trial Tr., p.210, L.7 - p.p.212, L.22.) He could also see at
least one person inside one of the trucks. (Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.11-12.) While he was
attempting to get the license number off of the vehicles, a person inside one of them
asked if he needed help. (Trial Tr., p.213, L.23 - p.216, L.24.)
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Mr. Riebe then opened the door to the truck and shined a flashlight inside. (Trial
Tr., ,p.217, Ls.2-20.)

There were two women inside of the truck.

(Trial Tr., p.217,

Ls.20-23.) When confronted, the women claimed that the truck had broken down and
that they were just waiting for someone to come drop off a part to fix the truck. (Trial
Tr., p.218, Ls.4-12.)

Mr. Riebe then closed the door of the truck and called police.

(Trial Tr., p.218, L.12 - p.219, L.12.)

While on the phone with police dispatch,

Mr. Riebe read off the license plate numbers and provided. descriptions of the trucks.
(Trial Tr., p.220, L.24 - p.225, L.22.)
While Mr. Riebe was doing this, the women who had been in the truck began
yelling for the other individuals to come back.

(Trial Tr., p.227, Ls.4-22.) Mr. Riebe

retreated into a cornfield next to the roadway. Shortly thereafter, several people came
running back towards to trucks. (Trial Tr., p.227, L.14 - p.228, L.17.) They then got
into the trucks and attempted to drive away. (Trial Tr., p.228, L.18 - p.232, L.12.) Still
on the phone with police, Mr. Riebe informed dispatch as to where the trucks were
driving away and was then told to return to his home. (Trial Tr., p.233, Ls.4-7.)
He came back out to his property later that morning to meet with police. (Trial
Tr., p.233, Ls.12-20.) Mr. Riebe noticed that a lock had been cut off another trailer and
that one of his shops had been broken into.

(Trial Tr., p.235, L.23 - p.236, L.23.)

Inside the shop, there were recent footprints that were visible in the dust on the floor,
and there were several items that had been moved. (Trial Tr., p.237, L.5 - p.238, L.9.)
Mr. Riebe testified that the footprints visible inside the shop were not his, since he did
not wear that type of shoe. (Trial Tr., p.243, L.23 - p.244, L.3.)
Although he was wearing night vision goggles, Mr. Riebe was unable to identify
Mr. Devan as being among any of the individuals present on the night of the alleged
3

burglary. (Trial Tr., p.249, L.15 - p.250, L.9.) He also did not hear any of the people
who were there refer to each other by name. (Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.15-22.)
Deputy Casey Zechmann was dispatched to the scene when Mr. Riebe first
called in the license plate numbers of the trucks parked next to his property. (Trial Tr.,
p.314, L.10-p.315, L.23.) The deputy saw headlights coming towards him as he made
his way to Mr. Riebe's property. As he passed, he saw the truck driving by matched the
description he was given for one of the vehicles.

(Trial Tr., p.316, Ls.2-10.) Deputy

Zechmann then pulled the truck over and confirmed that the license plate matched that
given for one of the trucks by Mr. Riebe. (Trial Tr., p.316, Ls.11-17.) After pulling the
truck over, the deputy eventually arrested the three people that were inside: Lauren
Jones, Darrin Boren, and Jenny Osborn.

After transporting them to the jail, Deputy

Zechmann returned to talk to Mr. Riebe. (Trial Tr., p.316, L.20 - p.320, L.4.)
When looking around the property, the deputy also took note of several shoe
prints around the property that were suspicious. (Trial Tr., p.320, L.12 - p.340, L.11.)
He also took a picture of some of these impressions. (Trial Tr., p.320, L.12 - p.340,
L.11.) Police were able to determine that the shoe print was made by a Nike shoe.
Although law enforcement seized Mr. Devan's shoes later that day, no one took the
shoes back to Mr. Riebe's property to make a comparison to the prints left there. (Trial
Tr., p.343, L.20 - p.345, L.14.)
Police Officer Dale Schreiber also testified on behalf of the State. He was sent to
a motel where police believed one of the trucks involved in the alleged burglary would
be located.

(Trial Tr., p.399, L.23 - p.401, L.23.)

After seeing the truck there and

confirming its license plate number, Officer Schreiber parked a short distance down the
street to watch the truck. (Trial Tr., p.401, L.17 - p.408, L.21.) Eventually, Mr. Devan
4

approached the officer's car from the direction of the motel. Officer Schreiber got out of
his car and crossed the street to talk to Mr. Devan. (Trial Tr., p.409, L.12 - p.410, L.21.)
Mr. Devan informed the officer that he thought that he was being followed by another
individual. (Trial Tr., p.410, L.16 - p.411, L.1.)
Because he was suspicious that Mr. Devan might have been one of the
individuals involved in the burglary, the officer asked Mr. Devan to empty his pockets
and provide identification.

(Trial Tr., p.411, Ls.2-12.)

The address on Mr. Devan's

driver's license was the same as that indicated on the registration of the truck that
Officer Schreiber was told was one of the vehicles suspected of being involved in the
burglary.

(Trial Tr., p.411, L.13 - p.412, L.3.)

At that point, the officer detained

Mr. Devan as a suspect in the burglary. (Trial Tr., p.412, Ls.4-22.)
The State also presented the testimony of some of Mr. Devan's alleged coconspirators.

Darrin Boren testified that Mr. Devan was present when he, Lauren

Jones, Levi Jones, and Dana Harris were all discussing preparations for going on to
Mr. Riebe's property. (Trial Tr., p.348, L.3 - p.353, L.15.) Mr. Boren testified that he
was explaining the nature of the property as being in a remote location and that it would
be easy for them to get on the property and take some items from there. (Trial Tr.,
p.353, L.25 - p.354, L.13.) Mr. Boren had already been on the property twice and had
taken things from there before. (Trial Tr., p.354, Ls.14-23.)
Once at Mr. Riebe's property, Mr. Boren claimed that some of the people present
were hesitant to go through with their plan. According to his testimony, Mr. Devan told
the group that they should go forward with the plan.

(Trial Tr., p.359, L.16 - p.360,

L.14.) He further claimed that Mr. Devan assisted Lauren Jones in cutting off a padlock
on one of the trailers on Mr. Riebe's property. (Trial Tr., p.360, Ls.15-21.) Once inside
5

the trailer, Mr. Boren testified that Mr. Devan and the others started moving things
around. Mr. Boren claimed that, upon being notified that the police were being called,
someone grabbed a bag full of "stuff" and everyone got back to the trucks and tried to
drive away. (Trial Tr., p.361, L.3 - p.363, L.19.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Boren acknowledged that he was unable to give
police Mr. Devan's name at the time of being questioned upon his arrest. He claimed
that he was confused and upset at the time, although he could identify his face. (Trial
Tr., p.367, L.10 - p.368, L.3.) But Mr. Boren was uncertain as to whether he had been
provided any photographic lineup in order to attempt to identify Mr. Devan, and further
was uncertain as to whether he was able to make a visual identification if that lineup
was provided. (Trial Tr., p.372, L.11 - p.373, L.21.) In addition, Mr. Boren admitted that
he was high on methamphetamine on the night of the alleged burglary and had been
told by police that he and his wife would receive harsher punishment if they did not
cooperate with the police. (Trial Tr., p.370, Ps.10-18; p.376, L.8 - p.378, L.3.)
Tiffany Jones, another alleged co-conspirator, also testified on behalf of the
State.

Ms. Jones admitted to being one of the group of people who burglarized

Mr. Riebe's property.

(Trial Tr., p.427, L.2 - p.428, L.1.)

Ms. Jones testified that

Mr. Devan was another of the individuals who was present for and participated in the
burglary, as well as in discussions immediately prior in which the plans for the burglary
were formulated.

(Trial Tr., p.428, L.2 - p.431, L.20.)

She further testified that

Mr. Devan drove herself and two other individuals to Mr. Riebe's property in his
mother's truck (Trial Tr., p.429, Ls.7-14.)
After the State rested its case, Mr. Devan presented the testimony of Gina White,
who worked at the motel where Mr. Devan was initially detained by police. (Trial Tr.,
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p.484, L.21 - p.485, L.6.) Although she had seen Mr. Devan driving the maroon truck
that was allegedly used in the commission of the burglary, she also testified that she
had seen that vehicle being driven more frequently by Dana Harris. (Trial Tr., p.485, L.9
- p.488, L.8.) Additionally, on the day of the alleged burglary, she testified that she had
seen Mr. Harris driving this truck with another individual, but that Mr. Devan was not in
the truck with them. (Trial Tr., p.488, Ls.14-20.)
Mr. Devan also testified on his own behalf and denied all prior knowledge of, or
involvement in, either the burglary or the conspiracy to commit burglary.

(Trial Tr.,

p.509, L.8 - p.512, L.25.) He testified that he had permitted Dana Harris to borrow his
mother's truck on the night prior to the alleged burglary, and that he had allowed
Mr. Harris to do so on previous occasions. (Trial Tr., p.515, L.24 - p.516, L.8.) But
Mr. Devan testified that he did not go with Mr. Harris or anyone else to Mr. Riebe's
property. (Trial Tr., p.516, Ls.13-15.) He also denied knowing several of the people
who admitted to having participated in the burglary.

(Trial Tr., p.515, Ls.14-17.)

Regarding the shoe prints that were found at Mr. Riebe's property, Mr. Devan
also denied that those were his. (Trial Tr., p.521, Ls.13-20.) Because he was familiar
with the Nike brand of shoes, Mr. Devan could testify to the fact that the sole prints were
a match to a wide variety of different and popular brands of Nike shoes.

(Trial Tr.,

p.519, L.3 - p.521, L.1.)
During closing arguments, defense counsel explained to the jury that there are
various standards of proof that may apply in court cases, but that the State was required
to establish proof by the highest of these standards - proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Trial Tr., p.596, L.9 - p.598, L.2.)

In rebuttal, the prosecutor first characterized the

arguments made by counsel as "gobbledygook," then proceeded to ask the jurors to,
7

"throw out all of the argument that the defense attorney gave you," with regard to
reasonable doubt in comparison to the lesser standards of proof.
Ls.19-25.)

(Trial Tr., p.614,

Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor asserted that defense counsel was

insulting the jurors with his argument, although the jurors didn't know it.
p.616, Ls.16-17.)

(Trial Tr.,

In addition, the prosecutor characterized defense counsel's

arguments regarding the failure to make a direct comparison between Mr. Devan's
shoes and the shoe prints at Mr. Riebe's property as an attempt to "punish the state"
and to "spoon-feed" the jury. (Trial Tr., p.619, Ls.14-24.)
Mr. Devan was convicted of conspiracy, burglary, and trespassing.

(Trial Tr.,

p.623, Ls.10-22; R., pp.82-83.) Following his conviction, he filed a motion for a mistrial
or, in the alternative, a new trial on the basis that two of the jurors, during the course of
trial, saw Mr. Devan in handcuffs in the hallway outside of the courtroom. (R., p.85.)
This motion was subsequently amended to include the additional grounds that
Mr. Devan was shackled with a leg restraint during the course of his trial without any
finding on the part of the trial court that such restraints were necessary. (R., pp.89, 91.)
The State filed an objection to this motion, asserting that Mr. Devan had failed to
make any objection to the leg restraints that were used and that a finding of necessity
for these restraints was not required given that they were not visible or apparent to the
jury. (R., pp.102-105.) The State further argued that any error in two jurors observing
Mr. Devan in restraints in the hallway during trial was harmless. (R., pp.105-106.)
The district court ultimately denied Mr. Devan's motion for a mistrial or,
alternatively, a new trial. (2/17/12 Tr., p.80, L.6 - p.86, L.23; R., pp.107-108). He was
sentenced to concurrent sentences of five years, with two years fixed, for each of his
convictions of conspiracy and burglary. (Trial Tr., p.687, L.687, L.9 - p.692, L.12; R.,
8

pp.120-122.)

However, the district court suspended these sentences and placed

Mr. Devan on probation for a term of five years. (Trial Tr., p.687, L.687, L.9 - p.692,
L.12; R., pp.120-122.)
Mr. Devan timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence.
p.127.)

9

(R.,

ISSUE
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, when
the prosecutor used inflammatory language calculated to appeal to the passions and
prejudice of the jury, disparaged defense counsel, and misstated the arguments raised
by defense counsel?

10

ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error,
When The Prosecutor Used Inflammatory Language Calculated To Appeal To
The Passions And Prejudice Of The Jury, Disparaged Defense Counsel, And
Misstated The Arguments Raised By Defense Counsel During The Course Of
Closing Arguments

A.

Standard of Review
Because there was no contemporaneous objection to the misconduct occurring

during closing arguments, this Court reviews Mr. Devan's allegation of prosecutorial
misconduct under the three-part test for fundamental error articulated in State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). Under this standard, fundamental error is established and
reversal is required if the defendant can establish that: (1) the alleged error violates one
or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear and
obvious from the record; and (3) there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected
the outcome of the trial proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
B.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental
Error, When The Prosecutor Used Inflammatory Language Calculated To Appeal
To The Passions And Prejudice Of The Jury In Characterizing Defense Counsel,
Misstated The Arguments Raised By Defense Counsel, And Invoked The
Prestige Of His Office During The Course Of Closing Arguments
Mr. Devan asserts that the prosecutor in this case committed misconduct, rising

to the level of a fundamental error, during the closing arguments in this case.
The purpose of closing arguments is to sharpen and clarify the issues that must
be resolved by the jury within the criminal case, and to assist the jurors in remembering
and interpreting the evidence at trial. See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct.
App. 2007). "Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing
argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints,
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the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom." Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan,
139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003)).
However, while both sides have considerable latitude to argue the evidence, that
latitude is not unbounded. Of particular note, closing arguments should not disparage
opposing counsel, misstate the evidence or the defense presented at trial, nor should
{

closing arguments contain improper appeals to the passion and prejudice of the jurors.
Id. at 86-87. Additionally, as quasi-judicial officers, prosecutors owe a special duty of

care in conducting closing arguments. As was noted over a century ago by the Idaho
Supreme Court:
Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the
court, and that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads
jurors to give more credence to their statements, action, and conduct in
the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give to
counsel for the accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and
ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and in
so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused. It is the duty of
the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and nothing but
competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he
should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors,
and tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced.
When he has submitted all the facts in the case to the jury he should be
content, but he should never seek by any artifice to warp the minds of the
jurors by inferences and insinuations.
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 71 P. 608, 611 (1908).
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law
as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. This can occur
where the prosecutor employs inflammatory language regarding the defendant or
defense counsel, particularly where that language is "seemingly calculated to arouse
negative emotions" on the part of the jury towards the defendant.
12

See Phillips, 144

Idaho at 87; see a/so State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 19 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Baruth,
107 Idaho 651, 657 (Ct. App. 1985). Likewise, it impacts upon a defendant's right to a
fair trial if a prosecutor misstates or misrepresents the evidence, or seeks to distort the
defense presented at trial.

See State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 909-910 (201 0);

State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 575-576 (Ct. App. 2007).
In this case, the prosecuting attorney made several statements during the
rebuttal portion of the State's closing argument that employed inflammatory language
that was calculated to give rise to negative emotions against the defendant and defense
counsel, and further misstated a portion of Mr. Devan's defense at trial.

From the

outset, the first word out of the prosecutor's mouth was, "Gobbledygook," which was
used in reference to the arguments of defense counsel.

Specifically, the prosecutor

stated:
Gobbledygook, that what the argument of the lawyers [sic] are, and that's
what they do. So the first thing I'm going to ask you to do is throw out all
of the argument that the defense attorney gave you about clear and
convincing evidence, yadda, yadda, yadda.
(Trial Tr., p.614, Ls.19-25.)
The prosecutor then went further, and characterized defense counsel's argument
as an "insult" to the intelligence of the jurors:
And what the defense is doing is really insulting, and you don't know
it. Because when we're little, we're spoon-fed. All I've done here -- and
they want you to be spoon-fed. They want you to have an expert come in
and tell you what you can already see. All I've done here is give you a
spoon. You can feed yourself.
(Trial Tr., p.616, Ls.16-22 (emphasis added).)
The prosescutor later returned to its theme of accusing the defense of attempting
to infantilize the jurors by "spoon-feeding" them later in rebuttal, but the prosecutor went
a step further. (Trial Tr., p.619, Ls.14-24.) The State characterized Mr. Devan's cross13

examination and argument as to the failure of the State to physically compare the shoes
taken from him with the actual prints on Mr. Riebe's property as an attempt to "punish"
the state, as well as to "spoon-feed" the jury. (Trial Tr., p.619, Ls.14-24.)
From the outset, the prosecutor in this case used inflammatory language in
calling defense counsel's argument "gobbledygook" that the jurors should "throw out."
This language was calculated to inflame the negative emotions of the jurors, rather than
elucidating the evidence and argument presented at trial.

However, this rebuttal

argument progressed to an even more egregious appeal to the passion and prejudice of
the jury when the prosecutor asserted that defense counsel's argument was an "insult"
to the jury - and that they just did not realize it was such.
In describing this purported "insult," the prosecutor routinely referenced "spoonfeeding," and expressly described this as an action that people undertake with small
children. The inference to be drawn from the prosecutor's repeated remarks was that
defense counsel was attempted to infantilize the jury, or was otherwise insulting their
intelligence through questioning some of the State's evidence and whether that
evidence met the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecutor's

statement that the defense was "insulting" them, and that the jury did not even realize it,
coupled with the theme of spoon-feeding of the jury is analogous to the misconduct that
occurred in Phillips, wherein the prosecutor repeatedly referenced that the jurors may
be irritated by the arguments raised by the defendant. See Phillips, 144 Idaho at 85.
Just as in Phillips, the assertion that the jurors were being personally insulted by
defense counsel's argument, coupled with the repeated claims that defense counsel
was trying to spoon-feed the jury, "was inflammatory language calculated to arouse
negative emotions." Id. at 87.
14

In addition, the State mischaracterized the defense in this case, and did so using
similarly inflammatory language, when the prosecutor argued that defense counsel was
seeking to "punish the state" when counsel challenged the failure of the State to make a
direct comparison of Mr. Devan's shoes with the actual shoe prints found at the scene
of the alleged burglary. Mr. Devan's arguments in this regard were aimed at an entirely
proper purpose - arguing the evidence from his respective standpoint and holding the
State to its burden of proof. It is not a "punishment" against the State to hold the State
to this burden, nor is it punishing the State to point out deficiencies in the State's case.
Taken together, the State's theme of appealing to the passion and prejudice of the jury
during its rebuttal closing argument was a violation of Mr. Devan's constitutional right to
a fair trial that is plain from the face of the record.
Moreover, this error is not harmless. From the outset, the alleged victim in this
case could not identify Mr. Devan as being one of the people who were present on the
night of the alleged burglary. He could not even state whether he had seen Mr. Devan
before that date.

The only persons who could connect Mr. Devan to the alleged

conspiracy and burglary were his alleged co-conspirators - each of which had the
motivation to curry favor with police and the prosecution to give favorable testimony in
light of the charges that they were themselves facing. Moreover, Mr. Devan presented
the evidence of a witness who had seen Dana Harris driving Mr. Devan's mother's truck
earlier on the day of the alleged burglaries when Mr. Devan was not in the truck. This
corroborated Mr. Devan's testimony that he was not present for, nor a conspirator in,
the planning or execution of any burglary.
Finally, the timing of this misconduct is also of special significance with regard to
measuring its prejudice. As was noted by the Court in Troutman:

15

It is important to note that this misconduct by the prosecutor occurred in
rebuttal argument. At this point in the trial the state has the last word and
is in a position to leave the last impression upon the jury. From an
evidentiary standpoint, this case was not open and shut for the state, and
Troutman presented a viable defense. Therefore, we cannot conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the result of the trial would not have been
different absent the distortion and mischaracterization of Troutman's
defense.
Troutman, 148 Idaho at 909-910.

Here, as in Troutman, the prosecutor had the opportunity to have the last word
and leave the last impression in the minds of the jurors as to how to evaluate this case.
The prosecutor used that opportunity to insinuate that the jurors should feel insulted by
defense counsel's arguments in trying to establish reasonable doubt within a case
where the proof of Mr. Devan's guilt was neither overwhelming nor uncontroverted. In
light of the repeated theme of appealing to the passions and prejudice of the jurors, as
well as the fact that Mr. Devan presented a plausible defense at trial, Mr. Devan submits
that there is a reasonable possibility that the misconduct" in this case affected the
outcome of the proceedings.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Devan respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgments of
conviction and sentences, and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of April, 2013.

'>c ,Lzt

SA~ E. TOMPKrs
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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